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What’s Fair in Foul Weather and Fair? Distributive
Justice across Different Allocation Contexts and
Goods
John T. Scott University of California, Davis
Brian H. Bornstein University of Nebraska, Lincoln
The Gulf coast hurricanes of a few years ago vividly highlighted important questions concerning the fair
distribution of resources that are of continual concern in the more mundane distributive policies of the modern
state. We present an experimental study of allocation decisions across two allocation contexts—nonemergency and
emergency (flood) conditions—and with regard to qualitatively different goods—money, prescription medicine,
and food. Distributive behavior is likely to vary across context and good depending on how individuals weigh
distinct and competing allocation principles—merit, need, and equality here—in different circumstances. We find
that allocation behavior is complex but structured, with context and good having predictable effects on the
allocation strategies individuals employ. Although we find that individuals overall tend to weigh certain allocation
principles more heavily in certain contexts and with regard to certain goods (e.g., emphasizing need in an
emergency context or with regard to prescription medicine), we also find that they do not behave in a lockstep
fashion and that they still employ a variety of allocation strategies, even in nonobvious ways, in every condition.
Our study makes both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to our understanding of allocation behavior and
distributive justice with implications for understanding the distributive decisions of policy makers as well as
citizens’ views of the fairness and legitimacy of policies.

T

he immediate and lingering effects of the
hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which hit the
Gulf Coast in 2005, as well as more recent
natural disasters such as flooding in the Midwest,
vividly highlight several important issues concerning
distributive justice. In addition to the questions about
systematic inequities revealed by the disproportionate
effects of the Gulf Coast hurricanes in particular, these
natural disasters spurred debate about the appropriate
distribution of resources to those affected. For example,
in response to the crisis the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) and the Red Cross
distributed debit cards to those affected by Katrina to
purchase food, clothing, housing, and other immediate
necessities, but this policy was promptly halted after
stories—apocryphal or not—that the cards were being
used by recipients for nonessential items like designer
boots and bar tabs. Wouldn’t it be more fitting, critics

asked, to provide essential goods directly and to allocate
them with regard to the specific deservingness or need
of individuals? While abandoning this novel debit card
program, governmental and nongovernmental agencies
nonetheless had to develop criteria for the appropriate
distribution of a variety of different goods from money
and food to medical care and housing.1
Natural cataclysms are rare events, but they
dramatically highlight issues of allocation context
and type of good that are of continual concern in
the more mundane distributive policies of the modern state, as well as decisions by nonstate organizations and even ordinary individuals. While money is
perhaps the good most widely distributed—and
collected—by government, many of the most important public policies involve the distribution of
nonmonetary resources. For example, healthcare resources are allocated through programs like Medicare,

1

For reports on the debit card policy, see FEMA press release HQ-05-218 (September 7, 2005); ‘‘Storm and Crisis: Government
Assistance,’’ New York Times, September 9, 2005 (A17).
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Medicaid, and organ transplant registries. Welfare
benefits include food and food stamps, and these goods
may be rationed more widely in certain circumstances,
such as wartime or drought. The fact that these various
goods are allocated through a plethora of government
programs, each with its own distribution rules, suggests
that different norms apply in distributing different
goods. Moreover, the fact that the rules governing the
distribution of these goods are often altered in the face
of changing contexts, such as poor economic conditions and natural disasters, further suggests that the use
of these distributive norms is influenced by context. In
short, allocation context and type of good appear to be
important factors in determining who gets what, when,
and how.
The complex questions of the just allocation of
goods at issue in emergencies and normal times alike
are amenable to systematic study through experimental analysis of the structure of distributive justice
behavior. In this paper, we contribute to this research
with an experimental study of individuals’ use of
distributive justice norms in making allocation decisions across different allocation contexts and with
regard to qualitatively different goods. We examine
the distribution of a variety of several goods central
to social welfare policies—money, prescription medicine, and food—and we examine their distribution
in two allocation contexts: a nonemergency condition
and an emergency (flood) condition. By systematically varying the allocation context and goods, we
analyze how these attributes of the allocation decision, as well as individual-level characteristics, influence distributive behavior. We examine these allocation
decisions under a condition of strict impartiality in
order to study distributive justice behavior apart from
instrumental factors, and even apart from such ultimately self-centered motives as reciprocity or ‘‘inequity
aversion’’ (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; see Frohlich,
Oppenheimer, and Kurki 2004). As Konow (2001,
139) argues, we need to isolate ‘‘unbiased justice’’ to
understand the interactions among principled and
egocentric factors that determine behavior.
Our study of the effects of context and good on
allocation decisions makes both a theoretical and an
empirical contribution to a growing literature on
allocation behavior and distributive justice. Experimental and other empirical studies across several
disciplines have shown that individuals have ‘‘pluralistic’’ views on justice that draw on several distinct
allocation principles and that they employ and weigh
these principles in accordance with predictable factors (see Deutsch 1986; Hegtvedt and Cook 1999;
Konow 2003; Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry 1980;
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Mikula 1980; Miller 1999, chap. 4; Schwinger 1980;
Törnblom 1992; Tyler et al. 1997). As one recent
study summarizes these findings, distributive justice
behavior is ‘‘complex but structured’’ (Michelbach
et al. 2003). Despite this pluralistic approach and its
findings, however, prior research has been surprisingly limited both theoretically and empirically
with regard to its very pluralism. First, although this
empirical research into distributive justice often draws
on normative theories such as Walzer’s (1984) argument that different allocation norms are appropriately
applied in different ‘‘spheres of justice,’’ the central
arguments of this influential vein of contemporary normative theory concerning the importance of allocation
context and type of good have received relatively little
empirical study. Our study is directly inspired by pluralist normative theories and examines their central claims.
Second, existing empirical studies have focused largely on the allocation of a single good—namely, money
or income—and with regard to a single context—
namely, productive activities (see esp. Frohlich and
Oppenheimer 1992; Michelbach et al. 2003; Mitchell
et al. 1993; Scott et al. 2001). One advantage of the
most sophisticated studies of the distribution of
money and income, however, has been to pose
participants with tradeoffs among different allocation
strategies that emphasize different allocation principles, thereby enabling us to more systematically understand the structure of allocation decisions. We
apply this approach to the study of the effect of
context and good on allocation behavior, where previous studies have generally been less systematic. Our
experimental design is based on the normative and
empirical scholarship regarding distributive justice
and allocation behavior, and so we outline these
literatures before presenting our experimental design
and predictions and then our results.
Our results reveal that both allocation context
and type of good have strong and predictable effects
on allocation behavior. Overall, we find that participants tend to weigh merit more heavily in the
nonemergency context and to be more oriented
toward need in the emergency (flood) context, and
we find that across both contexts participants tend to
emphasize merit when allocating money, emphasize
need when allocating prescription medicine, and
employ a more mixed set of strategies—including
an egalitarian strategy—when allocating food. However, while we find more emphasis on certain
allocation principles in different contexts and with
regard to different goods, we also find that participants do not behave in a lockstep fashion and that
they still employ a variety of allocation strategies in

distributive justice across different allocation contexts and goods
complex, and sometimes nonobvious, ways in every
condition.
Our study makes both a theoretical and an
empirical contribution to our understanding of allocation behavior and distributive justice with implications for understanding the policies of the modern
distributive state. Participants in our study perform a
task that, although admittedly stylized, makes their
role analogous to that of a policy maker or bureaucrat
determining what allocation policies to employ in
different domains. Their behavior therefore gives us
insight into the decision making of politicians and
policy makers who must also continually balance competing allocation strategies in ways that are sensitive to
differing contexts and qualitatively different goods.
Furthermore, our participants’ behavior also sheds
light on how ordinary citizens balance the core values
(see Feldman 1988) that determine their views of the
fairness and legitimacy of the social policies of the
modern state.

Which Is the Fairest One of All?
Philosophers, politicians, and parents have long
sought a clean way to cut the Gordian knot of
distributive justice, from Socrates’ ‘‘minding one’s
own business’’ to Rawls’ ‘‘justice as fairness,’’ to the
simple expedient used by parents from time immemorial of dividing a piece of cake by the method of
one child cuts and the other chooses (see Brams and
Taylor 1996). Little reflection is necessary, however,
to realize that fairness is no simple matter. Potentially
relevant differences in context, goods, and recipients
soon suggest themselves, rendering allocation a complex problem.

Pluralist Theories of Distributive Justice
The complexity of distributive justice is reflected in
an influential family of contemporary normative
theories that share a ‘‘pluralist’’ approach. Pluralist
theories developed largely in reaction to other distributive theories that reduce allocation to a single
dimension, as in utilitarianism or equity theory, or
that argue for a prioritization of principles, as in
Rawls. Pluralists suggest that such theories do injustice to our intuitions about distributive justice,
either forcing the distribution of goods into the
procrustean bed of a single allocation principle to
the exclusion of other plausibly relevant principles or
being unable to give guidance in domains or situations where the demands of justice seem to require
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it. In the emergency context of a natural disaster with
which we have illustrated the problem of distribution
of goods, for example, maximizing one allocation
principle to the exclusion of others, such as maximizing efficiency according to the dictates of utilitarianism, almost certainly conflicts with our commonsense
intuitions about justice. Likewise, Rawls’ (1971) theory of justice as fairness does not seem to speak to
such an emergency allocation context at all, or even
offer much guidance about how different ‘‘primary
goods,’’ which Rawls treats as equivalent, might be
legitimately distributed according to different principles or other criteria.
Perhaps the most prominent pluralist theory is
Walzer’s (1983) ‘‘spheres of justice.’’ Arguing that the
‘‘search for unity’’ in distributive justice theory ‘‘is to
misunderstand the subject matter of distributive
justice’’ (1983, 4), Walzer suggests instead that there
are different ‘‘spheres’’ of society in which different
distributive norms should predominate in allocating
the various goods typically associated with these
spheres. For example, he argues that in the sphere
of security and welfare the allocation of medical care
‘‘should be proportional to illness [i.e., need] and not
to wealth’’ (1983, 86), whereas other principles, such
as desert, become paramount in other situations,
notably in productive activities in the sphere of
money and commodities. Similarly, in his ‘‘local
justice’’ approach, Elster (1992, 1993) contends that
the allocation of scarce resources should follow
different principles in different arenas, for example
stating: ‘‘Need is central in allocating organs for
transplantation, merit in admitting students to college, and seniority in selecting workers for layoffs’’
(Elster 1993, 259). Finally, Miller (1999) develops a
similar approach in his explicitly pluralist theory,
arguing that the principles of social justice (need,
merit, and equality) depend upon context, and in
particular the ‘‘mode of human relationships’’ at
issue. In sum, according to this broad theoretical
approach, justice is context dependent but not context specific, meaning that the principles used in
allocation do not vary simply according to context but
rather are appropriately given varying weights in
different contexts (see also Deutsch 1986; Konow
2003, 1231–32).

Empirical Studies of Distributive Behavior
In order to buttress their claims, pluralistic theories
often appeal to empirical studies of allocation behavior and opinions (see esp. Miller 1999, chap. 3). The
empirical study of distributive behavior and opinions
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has been conducted for well over four decades in
several fields, primarily psychology and political
science, and using several methods, including public
opinion surveys and especially experiments (for overviews see Lerner and Lerner 1981; Mikula 1980;
Miller 1999; Törnblom 1992; Tyler et al. 1997).
Overall, this research has shown that distributive justice
decisions are complex but structured, with individuals
using a finite group of allocation principles—e.g.,
equality, need, merit, and efficiency—in making decisions or judgments and weighing these principles
according to predictable factors, including individuallevel attributes (see Konow 2003; Scott et al. 2001).
Despite the influence of pluralist theories on
experimental and other studies of distribution, this
research has been somewhat limited both theoretically and empirically with regard to its very pluralism. First, despite their appeal to the central
arguments of pluralist theories regarding the importance of allocation context and type of good, differences in context and good have not received much
systematic empirical analysis. Second, existing empirical studies have tended to focus on the allocation
of money or income and with regard to productive
activities alone. This focus on money and income has
had its advantages, for it has allowed scholars to focus
on the structure of allocation behavior—i.e., the
relationships among the allocation principles themselves and what factors influence how individuals
weigh them—with regard to a single, important, and
relatively concrete good. The study of the effects of
allocation context and type of good, in turn, has
tended to be less systematic in this regard. Our aim in
the present study is not only to draw more broadly
on pluralistic theories of justice in order to extend
our understanding of distributive behavior, but also
to extend the strengths of the existing studies focusing on the allocation of money into the study of the
effect of different contexts and goods.
Perhaps the most theoretically compelling aspect
of the most sophisticated empirical studies focusing
on the distribution of money and income has been
their systematic manipulation of allocation principles
in order to pose participants with clear tradeoffs
among these principles and thus clearly reveal the
structure of allocation behavior. For example, in a
microlevel study involving groups choosing a scheme
for fairly allocating income derived from a hypothetical or actual productive task, Frohlich and
Oppenheimer (1992) found that the clear majority
of groups chose a compromise between need (setting
a minimum floor for income) and efficiency (i.e.,
maximizing total income). Several macrolevel studies
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examining individuals’ views about the distribution
of income across society confirm that distributive
justice decisions generally involve tradeoffs among
distinct principles. Scott et al. (2001) identified
several distinct allocation strategies that balanced
equality, efficiency, and need contingent upon assumptions about merit (see also Michelbach et al.
2003; Mitchell et al. 1993; Mitchell et al. 2003).
Despite their limited focus in terms of context and
good, then, the ultimate concern of these studies with
the allocation principles themselves provides good
theoretical warrant to expect that distributive justice
behavior concerning different allocation contexts and
goods will have a similarly complex yet structured
character.
The study of the effects of context and type of
good on allocation behavior is both theoretically and
empirically less developed. With regard to different
types of goods, the few existing studies confirm the
intuition that individuals will tend to emphasize
different principles when distributing qualitatively
different goods. Nonetheless, at least two characteristics of this research make it difficult to compare
across these studies or to draw more systematic
conclusions about the structure of allocation behavior. First, the sheer variety and generally atheoretic
choice of ‘‘goods’’ examined in these studies make it
difficult to generalize their results for further systematic examination. Second, these studies commonly
examine both ‘‘goods’’ that are ‘‘goods’’ independent
of the relationship between giver and recipient (e.g.,
money) and ‘‘goods’’ that are only such because of
the nature of the relationship (e.g., love), with the
result that it is difficult to study the structure of the
allocation behavior independent of other factors than
the difference in the goods themselves. These researchers are not unaware of these difficulties. Foa
and Foa (1974, chap. 5; see also Törnblom and Foa
1983), for example, argued that variation in the use of
allocation principles across the goods they examine
(love, service, status, tangible goods, information,
and money) can be explained in part by their different exchange properties. They accounted for many of
the differences they find in the interpersonal exchange of the goods they examine by classifying
resources along two dimensions: particularism (i.e.,
the value of a resource as influenced by the particular
persons involved in exchanging it and their relationship to one another) and concreteness (i.e., whether
the resources are relatively concrete as opposed to
symbolic). Some of the findings of these studies are
relevant to our research, for example that individuals
evaluating hypothetical transfers tended to prefer
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equality when distributing tangible goods (as well as
love and services) and to split in their preferences
over equality and merit when allocating money
(Törnblom and Foa 1983; see also Herlocker et al.
1997).
In order to obviate the complexities associated
with the confounding effects of the nature of the
interpersonal relationship and the character of the
goods, in our study we will examine only how
disinterested third-party allocators distribute concrete goods. More similar to our study in these
regards, and therefore more relevant, is a study by
Skitka and Tetlock (1992) which assessed justice
preferences of third-party allocators for the distribution of three different goods: organs available for
transplantation, the drug AZT for AIDS patients, and
low-income housing for the poor. They found that
ratings of various distribution options were highly
correlated across resource, perhaps because the three
goods they examined are all highly associated with
need. In our study, we build on this approach and
broaden it to look at a number of concrete goods that
are not all highly associated with a single allocation
principle. Finally, in a nonexperimental study especially relevant to our analysis of fairness in a flood,
Skitka (1999) examined public opinion in the wake of
the 1993 flood in the Midwestern United States,
analyzing the determinants of willingness to extend
humanitarian aid to victims of the disaster. She found
that respondents were more supportive of providing
for flood victims’ ‘‘primary’’ needs (e.g., food items
like milk) as opposed to ‘‘secondary’’ needs (e.g.,
cookie dough). Furthermore, she found that respondents—even in the context of a natural disaster—
considered information about personal responsibility
(e.g., whether recipients had flood insurance) when
judging deservingness, with liberals more likely to
support providing assistance regardless of perceived
responsibility in comparison to conservatives. In our
study we similarly examine how individuals weigh
need and merit in their allocation decisions in both
an emergency context, similar to Skitka, and a nonemergency context.
While there is therefore little research into how
different types of goods are distributed, greater
consideration has been paid to the influence of
situational factors on allocation behavior, or what
usually falls under the broad rubric of ‘‘context.’’
Once again, the variety of contexts that have been
examined is quite broad. Commonly cited context
variables include the relationship between parties
(Bierhoff, Buck, and Klein 1986; Foa and Foa 1974;
Mikula 1980); whether the parties expect future
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interactions (Bierhoff et al. 1986); allocation objectives, such as creating solidarity versus maximizing
efficiency (Deutsch 1986; Mikula 1980); environment
or institutional setting (Foa and Foa 1974); and
disclosure of the allocation decision (Mikula 1980).
Several of these findings are potentially relevant for
our study of allocation behavior in an emergency
(flood) versus nonemergency (nonflood) context. For
example, Bierhoff , Buck, and Klein (1986; see also
Deutsch 1986) proposed that different principles will
be preferred in different domains: equality is preferable for any domain where similarity among people
is emphasized, such as those involving mutual support or close relationships (loosely analogous to our
flood context, where all the recipients have been
affected by the emergency, though not to the same
extent), whereas equity or merit is preferable for
economic, scientific, and technical productivity,
where differences among people are paramount
(analogous to the nonflood context in our study).
Overall, however, as with most studies of different
goods, these studies of the effect of context tend to be
highly varied in both design and results, making it
difficult to develop hypotheses for our study.
In order to make the effect of context more
tractable, we examine two opposed contexts (nonemergency versus emergency) while holding everything else constant across contexts. Our study design
therefore builds more directly on several lines of
research. First is the influential study of contextual
features by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986),
which proposed a theory of fair transactions that rely
on several factors including what they characterize as
framing effects (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979),
but which can also fruitfully be viewed as contextual
effects (see Konow 2003, 1217). We likewise compare
effects across opposed contexts (or ‘‘frames’’). Second, several studies have also examined the effect
of context in terms of scarcity, analogous to our
examination of an emergency situation, as opposed
to plenty. These studies have generally found that
when there are sufficient or abundant resources,
merit or equality predominate, but that need and
efficiency gain appeal when resources are scarce
(Greenberg 1981; Lane and Messe 1972; Skitka and
Tetlock 1992). A similar result exists regarding allocation behavior in primarily productive versus nonproductive domains: Major, Bylsma, and Cozzarelli
(1989) found that equity (or merit) was the main
allocation principle used in work contexts, especially
for men, in comparison to relationship contexts (see
also Bierhoff, Buck, and Klein 1986; Kidder, Fagan,
and Cohn 1981).

836

john t. scott and brian h. bornstein

Finally, empirical research on distributive justice,
as well as analogous studies of public opinion, suggests that individual-level factors such as gender and
ideology affect allocation decisions and opinions. As
for gender, most studies show that women tend to be
more oriented toward equality and need, whereas
men tend to weigh merit more heavily (Kidder et al.
1981; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Kluegel, Mason, and
Wegener 1995; Major and Deaux 1982; Michelbach
et al. 2003; Scott et al. 2001). Similar gender effects have
been found in analogous—and possibly related—
research on the application of core values to public
opinion (see Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998;
Gilens 1988; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Shapiro
and Mahajan 1986; Welch and Hibbing 1992). Nonetheless, other studies find that the more need-oriented
and egalitarian tendencies of women are mediated to
some degree by various factors, such as their assumptions about merit (Scott et al., 2001; see Bierhoff,
Buck, and Klein 1986; Mikula 1980). Political ideology has likewise been shown to affect distributive
justice behavior, with liberals more concerned with
equality and conservatives with efficiency (Mitchell
et al. 2003; Mitchell et al. 1993; Scott et al. 2001; Tetlock
and Mitchell 1993). Similarly, conservatives tend to
be less concerned with need than liberals, especially as
merit level increases (see Scott et al. 2001; Skitka and
Tetlock 1992, 1993; Tetlock and Mitchell 1993).

Theoretical Expectations
In conclusion, we can summarize our expectations
with regard to the theoretical and empirical literature.
First, our study draws on pluralist normative theories
which suggest that allocation behavior should vary
according to context and good. Unlike alternative
theories such as utilitarianism or Rawls that offer no
differential predictions, these pluralist theories suggest broad expectations about differences in behavior
according to context and good. With regard to
context, for example, we expect that individuals will
weigh need more heavily in an emergency context
(akin to Walzer’s sphere of security and welfare),
where recipients’ need is a more salient consideration
compared to a nonemergency context, where merit
would be more salient (akin to Walzer’s sphere of
money and commodities). Pluralist theories have
focused largely on spheres or allocation contexts
and on the goods generally associated with those
different spheres, but we can build on the intuition of
these theories, as well as the theoretical framework
developed in certain empirical studies, by suggesting
that recipients’ need for a given good depends in

large part on the specificity of the relationship
between the individual and the good. Thus, while
all individuals need food in order to survive (suggesting an approximately equal division of such a good
all else being equal), only certain individuals need a
particular medicine (e.g., AZT, insulin, etc.), and
therefore distribution of such goods should be largely
in accordance with specific need. By contrast, while
all individuals may need money in a broad sense, the
fungible character of money means that there is no
specific relationship between money and a given
individual that makes money a particularized need,
especially when other more specific needs such as
food and medicine have been provided. Money is
therefore less likely to be distributed according to
need, all else being equal, and more likely to be
distributed according to merit given the strong
association between money and reward.
Second, in accordance with broadly pluralist
findings of previous empirical research, we expect
to find that justice behavior is structured yet complex, with individuals employing different allocation
strategies in predictable ways according to various
factors. More specifically, we expect allocation context and type of good to be important factors in
decisions. In order to confirm and extend these
previous studies of context and good, we apply the
methodology of posing participants with clear tradeoffs among allocation strategies. This methodology
has been employed primarily in studies of the
distribution of money or income, and we also limit
ourselves to tangible goods that can be readily
compared. Based on previous studies, we expect that
individuals will weigh merit more heavily in a nonemergency context or when distributing money in
any context, whereas they will weigh need more
heavily in an emergency context or when distributing
prescription medicine in any context. Finally, in
accordance with previous studies, we expect that
individual-level attributes, such as gender and ideology, will have predictable effects on behavior.

Research Design
In order to examine how allocation context and type
of good affect individuals’ use of allocation principles, we employ an experimental design in which we
vary the context and good and then ask participants
to make decisions where these principles or allocation
strategies conflict. Specifically, we analyze how individuals weigh merit, need, and equality in their allocation
decisions (holding efficiency, i.e., the amount allocated

distributive justice across different allocation contexts and goods

837

F IGURE 1 Experimental Instructions (Part 1)
An area has experienced flooding due to heavy rains produced by a storm. There is a
relief center close to the flood area where various supplies are stored for emergency
purposes. The relief center is not in danger of being flooded. [There is a relief center where
various supplies are stored for emergency purposes. There is no emergency at this time. The
relief center needs to hire people to work. They are paid with the various supplies stored at
the center.]
You are an administrator at the relief center and must decide how these supplies should
be distributed to individuals affected by the flood [working at the relief center].
Individuals from the flood area [ ] arrive at the relief center each morning. When they
arrive, they fill out requests for the various supplies stored at the relief center. They can
request up to 100 units of each supply (e.g., “units” of clothing). They also provide
information about their income, marital and family status, health, and related information.
Then they meet with a supervisor who reviews the information and approves their requests
based upon their need.
During the day, these individuals unload and package the various supplies stored in
warehouses at the relief center. The amount of supplies that can be distributed at the end of
the day will depend in part on how much of the supplies are unloaded and packaged during
the day. Therefore, these individuals are told that the amount of supplies that they unload
and package may be considered when distributing the supplies.
Individuals are assigned in groups of two people to a warehouse where they work under
a supervisor. They do not know their co-worker or how much their co-worker requested of
any goods. Each individual works independently unloading and packaging various supplies.
All of the individuals work the same amount of time. They are equally able to do the work.
At the end of each day the supplies are distributed. Several different supplies are
passed out each day. You are assigned the job of distributing one of those supplies.
Individuals cannot trade or sell any of the supplies after they are distributed.
The individuals come to you, the administrator, two at a time—in the pairs that worked
in the same warehouse under the same supervisor. They bring:
• The approved request they filled out in the morning for the supply you are
distributing.
• Information about how many boxes of supplies they unloaded and packaged during
the day.
You then distribute the supply to the individuals in a way that you think is appropriate.

in each case, constant). By experimentally manipulating
allocation context and type of good, we can isolate the
factors that influence how individuals employ these
principles under different conditions.

Experimental Design
First, in order to study the effect of allocation
context, each participant is randomly assigned to
one of two experimental conditions: a nonemergency
or an emergency condition. Figure 1 provides the first
part of the experimental instructions, with the instructions for the emergency (flood) condition in
italics and the nonemergency condition in brackets.
We chose a flood as our example of an emergency
context because it is among the more common
natural disasters and because other natural disasters
can themselves cause flooding (e.g., hurricanes or
tsunamis). These different conditions are represented
in the description of the relief center’s operations in

the participant instructions, where they are asked to
imagine they are administrators at a relief center
whose job it is to distribute various supplies. Although
the task performed by the study participants is admittedly stylized, their role is analogous to that of a policy
maker or bureaucrat in determining what allocation
rule to employ under various conditions.
Second, in order to study the effect of different
goods, participants in each allocation context condition are then randomly assigned to one of three
experimental conditions representing the good they
were asked to allocate: money, prescription medicine, or food.2 These two manipulations create six

2

We originally included another good, cotton candy, but have
dropped that experimental condition from our presentation
because of the difficulty of distinguishing between ‘‘want’’ and
‘‘need’’ as an allocation principle for this particular good. Since
our experimental manipulations are all between-subject, excluding this good has no effect on the results presented.
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F IGURE 2 Experimental Instructions (Part 2)
You are given the job of distributing money [prescription medicine, food]. You have
100 units of money [food, prescription medicine] to distribute to each pair of individuals.
You must distribute all 100 units.
Smith’s approved request:
Jones’s approved request:

66 units of money [prescription medicine, food]
34 units of money [prescription medicine, food]

Smith packaged:
Jones packaged:

34 boxes
66 boxes

How many units of money should Smith receive? (Jones receives the rest.) _____

between-subject experimental conditions (context 3
good).
Finally, having been assigned to one of these six
between-subject experimental conditions, each participant is presented with four randomly ordered
allocation scenarios (within-subject). Each of these
scenarios requests a separate allocation decision for a
different pair of individuals (e.g., Smith and Jones)
based on two pieces of information about the
recipients: the amount of their approved requests
for the supply being allocated and the amount of
work they accomplished. Figure 2 provides these
instructions.
For each scenario, we vary the amount of the
recipients’ approved requests (representing need) and
the amount they worked (representing merit), in
order to pose the participant with tradeoffs among
different allocation strategies. In order to ensure that
the information about the amount of work done by
each recipient represents merit, we make clear that
this work depends upon effort by emphasizing that
the recipients worked independently, worked the
same amount of time, and were equally able to do
the work (for the empirical relationship between
effort and merit, see Konow 2003, 1207–11). Similarly, in order to evoke the recipients’ need, rather
than mere want (see Braybrooke 1987), we emphasize
that the recipients’ requests had been approved by
administrators based on income, marital and family
status, health, and related information. For each of
the four allocation decisions, participants distribute
100 units of the given good between a separate pair of
recipients. The answers to these questions provide the
data used to create the dependent variables for
analysis.
In three of the four allocation scenarios, we
contrast the amount of the approved request and
the amount worked in order to place need and merit

in opposition, thereby posing participants with opposed choices among allocation strategies. For example, participants are told that Smith had an approved
request of 66 units of prescription medicine and had
packaged 34 boxes of supplies, whereas Jones had an
approved request of 34 units of prescription medicine
and had packaged 66 boxes of supplies. In this case,
then, the participant is faced with a choice as to
whether to reward merit (for example, allocating
34 units to Smith and the remaining 66 units to Jones)
or to reward need (for instance, giving 66 units to
Smith and 34 units to Jones), or to adopt a mixed or
egalitarian strategy. The three scenarios, with counterbalanced amounts for work and approved request,
were: 66 vs. 34, 75 vs. 25, and 90 vs. 10 (and, in order
to control for possible framing effects, the obverse
equivalents: 34 vs. 66, 25 vs. 75, and 10 vs. 90).
We include these three scenarios with increasingly
disproportionate differences in the contributions and
needs of the two recipients because, based on previous
studies (Michelbach et al. 2003; Mitchell et al. 1992;
Scott et al. 2001), we anticipate that participants may
be increasingly more liable to reward merit where they
see the recipient as particularly ‘‘deserving.’’
In the scenarios that contrast merit and need an
answer by a participant that splits a good 50/50
between the two recipients is equivocal: it could
mean that the participant is allocating according to
strict equality or, alternatively, it could mean that the
participant is giving equal weight to merit and need.3
In order to distinguish specifically egalitarian behavior from a mixed strategy equally balancing merit and
3
Participants could in principle balance all three principles—
merit, need, and equality—but we believe that this is a rare case
and, in any event, our experimental design does not allow us to
calculate the weights simultaneously given to these three principles in any unambiguous manner.
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need, therefore, we include a fourth scenario in which
the amount of work and the amount of the approved
request—that is, merit and need—are not in opposition and in which allocating according to equality is
therefore an unambiguously distinct strategy. So, for
example, in this fourth vignette Smith had an
approved request of 75 units of money and packaged
75 boxes of supplies, whereas Jones had an approved
request of 25 units of money and packaged 25 boxes
of supplies. In this scenario, then, an answer of 50/50
is clearly being made with an eye to equality, as
opposed to reflecting a mixed strategy balancing
merit and need. By comparing the response to this
fourth scenario to responses in any of the other three
scenarios, we can identify participants whose allocation decisions are made in accord with strict equality
as opposed to a mixed strategy.
Finally, participants complete a postexperimental
questionnaire requesting demographic information
to be used as independent and control variables in the
analyses.

Experimental Setting and Participants
Participants were 580 undergraduates, recruited for
the study in political science classes at the University
of California, Davis, in which they received course
credit for participation. 344 participants completed
the experiment in a classroom as a pen-and-paper
version, and the remaining participants completed
the same experiment on computers in a laboratory.
Since there were no statistically significant differences
between testing groups, we combined the data for all
analyses. Participants were 47.1% women, and ranged
in age from 18 to 49, with a mean (and median) age
of 19 years old.4

Data and Analysis
All of our analyses use a categorical variable representing participants’ allocation strategies—merit,
need, mixed, and egalitarian—that we create based
on their responses in the allocation scenarios. While
participants may allocate the good to the first
4

We are reasonably confident that there is nothing specific about
our respondent sample that should raise undue concerns about
the generalizability of our results. We pretested our experiment at
two other universities (the University of Houston and Louisiana
State University) using students recruited in both political science
and psychology courses. Furthermore, the student population at
the University of Houston is considerably more demographically
varied in terms of age, race or ethnicity, and SES than a typical
undergraduate population (see Scott et al. 2001, 762). We found
very similar results in our pretests using these different populations as we did in our final study.
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recipient in the pair anywhere within the range of
0–100 units (with the remainder going to the second
recipient), our theory suggests that their allocation
decisions will be based on the several distinct allocation principles. Participants’ decisions should, therefore, cluster on the responses representing one of
these principles or a clear tradeoff between them,
enabling us to categorize their behavior with confidence. As noted above, since participants’ behavior
was consistent across the different allocation scenarios, we will present only the categorization of their
behavior based on the 66 vs. 34 scenario (using the
fourth, noncontrasted scenario to identify egalitarians).
Analysis of the data confirms that the clear
majority of participants do indeed cluster their
responses as anticipated. Indeed, about half of the
participants are readily classified, since their responses indicate an unambiguous reliance upon
either merit or need, with 28% of participants across
experimental conditions allocating strictly according
to need and 21% strictly according to merit. Another
25% of participants chose an even 50/50 split. A total of 74% of participants therefore chose one of
the focal point responses, exhibiting well-behaved
preferences.
In order to identify egalitarian behavior and to
distinguish it from a mixed strategy balancing merit
and need among those choosing a 50/50 split, we
compared participants’ behavior in the 66 vs. 34
scenario (on which we shall focus in presenting our
results) where merit and need are contrasted to their
response in the fourth scenario, where an egalitarian
response is unambiguous. In this fourth scenario,
12.5% of participants chose the response of a 50/50
split between recipients, indicating strictly egalitarian
behavior. Of these, 76.0% also chose an even split in
the 66 vs. 34 scenario, meaning that we can confidently identify 9.5% of participants overall in the
66 vs. 34 scenario as egalitarians since they exhibit
strictly egalitarian behavior in both scenarios. All of
the other participants who chose an even 50/50 split
are therefore classified as adopting a mixed strategy.
Finally, we classified the relatively few remaining
participants whose answers did not cluster on one
of these focal point answers by simply assigning them
to the category (merit, mixed, or need) to which they
were arithmetically closest.
In all of our statistical analyses we employ a
multinomial logit regression using a dependent variable with four categories representing the four
allocation strategies used by participants: merit, need,
equality, and mixed. In order to analyze allocation
context and good, in the full model we include
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separate variables for each of the six experimental
conditions to which a participant can be assigned
(context 3 good). We further include independent
variables for Gender (with Woman51), Ideology
(coded 0–6, with 0 being extremely liberal), and a
control variable for Mother’s Education as a proxy for
SES (coded 0–6, with 0 being less than high school
education). Finally, we include a variable to control
for possible framing effects in the presentation of the
scenario, Merit Frame.5

Results
We are interested in examining differences in allocation strategies across context and good as well as in
determining the individual-level factors such as
gender and ideology that affect participants’ choice
of strategy. When analyzing the results of the behavior in the different allocation scenarios that contrast
merit and need (66 vs. 34, 75 vs. 25, and 90 vs. 10),
we found nearly identical behavior by participants
across scenarios. We will therefore henceforth focus
on the results based on the 66 vs. 34 scenario.6
Table 1 reports the results of two multinomial
logit regression models that analyze allocation strategies based on the 66 vs. 34 allocation scenario. In the
first, reduced model (Column A), we analyze only the
allocation context (nonflood vs. flood) for an initial
test of the effect of allocation context alone, and in
the full model (Column B) we analyze the experimental manipulations of both context and good. The
merit category serves as the baseline for these
analyses, and, since we expect that the NonfloodMoney condition will be the most extreme in terms of
merit behavior, we omit that condition in the full
5
The Merit Frame variable is coded 1 if the first recipient in an
allocation decision had the higher amount worked in comparison
to the second recipient (e.g., 66 vs. 34) and 0 if the first recipient
had the lower amount worked (e.g., 34 vs. 66). In addition, in
order to test for framing effects due to the order in which the four
vignettes were presented to the participant we included a variable
for order of presentation in initial analyses, but do not include it
in the final models since it was not statistically significant and
since omitting it did not change any other results.
6
We did find that there was a very slight increase in the likelihood
of merit behavior in the 90 vs. 10 scenario, as expected, increasing
the predicted probability of a participant allocating a given good
by about 5% in comparison to the other two scenarios, and
generally at the reduced probability of allocating according to a
mixed strategy. The only notable exception to the difference in
merit behavior for participants in the 90 vs. 10 scenario was the
allocation of prescription medicine in the flood condition, with a
predicted probability of 30.4% in comparison to 16.7% in the
66 vs. 34 scenario.

model so that it provides the comparison group for
the behavior in the other conditions.
The reduced model (Column A) reveals that
context affects participants’ choice of allocation
strategy as expected. The positive and significant
coefficient for the Flood variable for both the need
and mixed categories indicates that participants in
the flood condition were more likely across goods to
allocate according to a mixed strategy or according to
need than those in the nonflood context. Conversely,
if we change the baseline category for the analysis we
can also see that participants were less likely to
allocate according to merit in the flood as opposed
to the nonflood context, also as expected. Finally,
participants were equally likely to allocate according
to equality in both contexts.
If the reduced model demonstrates that participants’ allocation behavior across goods changes
according to context, the full model, analyzing the
effect of both context and good (Column B), shows
that participants’ allocation strategies vary according
to good as well. Although we will detail these results
below, we can see that participants are more likely to
allocate money according to merit and medicine
according to need, regardless of context, and are
somewhat more likely to allocate food according to
equality across contexts, at least in comparison to
when allocating the other goods. Finally, with regard
to individual-level variables, we find a somewhat
surprising effect with regard to gender. Namely, we
find that women’s and men’s choice of allocation
strategies is indistinguishable, which is somewhat
contrary to our expectation, based on previous research, that women are more likely to allocate according to need and men are more likely to rely on merit.
The results for ideology are, however, in line with our
expectations, with liberals being somewhat more likely
to allocate according to need (as well as according to a
mixed strategy) in comparison to according to merit
and vice versa for conservatives.7 Since men and
women behave similarly across different allocation
contexts and goods, we will henceforth combine them
in presenting our results.

7
As for the control variable for the Merit Frame, we do detect a
statistically significant effect in one instance. Namely, those
participants who were presented with the higher amount worked
for the first recipient (i.e., those with the Merit Frame coded 1)
were somewhat more likely to allocate according to need as
opposed to merit. Since this framing effect was not consistently
statistically significant either in our analysis of the 66 vs. 34
allocation scenario or across the other allocation scenarios, and
since its effects were quite modest, we simply control for its
effects.
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T ABLE 1

Multinomial Logit Regression Analysis of Allocation Behavior

Baseline Comparison
Category: Merit
Flood
Nonflood-Medicine

Need
A
.82*
(.23)
—

Nonflood-Food

—

Flood-Money

—

Flood-Medicine

—

Flood-Food

—

Gender
Ideology
Mother’s Education
Merit Frame
Constant
N
Chi2, df, p
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2.17
(.23)
2.17*
(.07)
.08
(.07)
1.18*
(.23)
2.50
(.41)

Equality
B

A
.40
(.33)
—

.72*
(.35)
.24
(.34)
.68
(.39)
1.67*
(.41)
.73*
(.37)
2.17
(.23)
2.17*
(.08)
.07
(.07)
1.41*
(.25)
2.73
(.43)

—
—
—
—
2.15
(.32)
2.16
(.10)
2.07
(.10)
.43
(.35)
2.71
(.50)

Mixed
B

.42
(.64)
1.02*
(.51)
.68
(.39)
1.12
(.68)
1.30*
(.56)
2.17
(.32)
2.16
(.10)
2.07
(.10)
.62
(.38)
21.28*
(.62)

A
.56*
(.24)
—
—
—
—
—
2.17
(.24)
2.18*
(.08)
.05
(.07)
.22
(.26)
2.13
(.43)

B

1.03*
(.39)
.82*
(.37)
1.06*
(.40)
1.65*
(.45)
.79
(.42)
2.19
(.24)
2.18*
(.08)
.05
(.07)
.47
(.27)
2.70
(.49)
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Reduced Model (Column A): 57.5, 18, .00
Full Model (Column B): 78.2, 29, .00

Note: *p , .05, two-tailed test with standard errors in parentheses.

In order to make these results easier to interpret
substantively, we calculated predicted probabilities
for the full model of the multinomial logit regression.8 The graphical presentation of the predicted
probabilities (Figure 3) enables us to make several
comparisons following from our hypotheses and also
to summarize our findings before going through
them in more detail.
d

First, we can compare participants’ allocation
strategies within any specific experimental condition
(context 3 good). For example, in the NonfloodMoney condition we see that a predicted 46.1% of
participants allocated according to merit, 27.5%
according to need, 8.7% according to strict equality, and 17.7% according to a mixed strategy.
Looking across all of the separate conditions, then,

8
More specifically, in order to generate predicted probabilities for
each experimental condition, we set the independent variables
(Ideology, Mother’s Education, and the Merit Frame) at their
means, and, since we found no statistically significant difference
in the behavior of men and women, set Gender at 0.

d

d

we can see that participants definitely employ a
variety of allocation strategies.
Second, we can compare strategies in allocating a
specific good across allocation context, for example, the allocation of money in the nonflood versus
flood conditions. Comparing the allocation of each
good across context, then, we see that context
affects the choice of strategy for at least two of the
goods, money and prescription medicine, with
participants far more likely to emphasize merit
for both goods in the nonflood condition and
more likely to emphasize need for both goods in
the flood context, as expected.
Third, we can compare allocation strategies across
goods within an allocation context, for example the
allocation of money compared to prescription
medicine within the flood condition. We see, then,
that participants across allocation contexts emphasize merit when allocating money and need when
allocating prescription medicine, both as expected.
When allocating food, in turn, participants adopt a
more diverse set of allocation strategies, notably
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F IGURE 3 Predicted Probabilities for Allocation Behavior
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For simplicity’s sake, we will concentrate on the results for the two main and opposed allocation
strategies—merit and need—and then discuss the
results concerning egalitarian behavior.
Our first hypothesis concerns the effect of context (nonflood vs. flood) on allocation behavior. Although the initial analysis of the effect of context
alone in the reduced model showed an overall effect,
when we look at differences in allocation strategy for
each of the different goods in the full model we see
that the allocation context has a statistically significant effect for money and prescription medicine, but
not for food. In other words, the overall increased
propensity for participants to allocate according to
merit in the nonflood context is driven by their
allocation of prescription medicine and particularly
of money. Likewise, the overall increased likelihood
that participants would allocate according to need in
the flood context was due to their behavior with
regard to money and especially to prescription
medicine.
The effect of allocation context on the distribution of both money and prescription medicine is
quite striking. Our expectations were that participants overall would be most oriented toward merit
when allocating money in the nonflood condition,
and the results confirm this hypothesis. In fact,
participants in the Nonflood-Money condition were
by far most likely to allocate according to merit (with
a predicted probability of 46.1%) in comparison to
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any other experimental condition, including the
Flood-Money condition (27.0%). We also see a significant change across allocation contexts in the
probability of a participant distributing money according either to a mixed strategy or to need, with the
probability of allocating money according to need
rising from 27.5% in the nonflood context to 31.6%
in the flood context. (The change in the probability of
a participant allocating according to a mixed strategy
is almost identical in direction and magnitude.) All of
these effects are statistically significant differences
(p , .05).
The results are similarly striking with regard to
prescription medicine, where we expected that participants overall would favor need as an allocation
principle. Participants in the Flood-Medicine condition were by far more likely to allocate according to
need (46.9%) than those in any other group, including the Nonflood-Medicine condition (34.1%). Likewise, as with the allocation of money, the probability
that a participant allocating prescription medicine
will do so according to merit drops nearly in half
from the nonflood context (27.9%) to the flood
context (14.8%). Finally, in contrast to money and
prescription medicine, the allocation strategies used
for distributing food were not statistically significantly influenced by context.
We have focused thus far on merit and need, but
we find one notable result with regard to equality as
an allocation strategy. Namely, while the predicted
probability of allocating according to equality generally varies with a relatively small but consistent
range of about 10% of participants across conditions,
there were significantly more egalitarians with regard
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to one good: food. Specifically, the predicted probability of a participant allocating food in the flood
condition according to equality is 18.5%, which is a
considerably higher likelihood than in any other
condition, except for in the Nonflood-Food condition,
where we see a predicted 16.7%. The increased
probability of allocating according to equality more
for food than for the other goods is, however, only a
marginally significant effect.9
In sum, then, we have found that both allocation
context and good matter for determining what
allocation strategies participants are likely to adopt.
As for allocation context, we have seen that participants emphasize merit in the nonflood context and
need in the flood context. As for goods, we have
found that across allocation contexts participants are
most likely to allocate money according to merit,
prescription medicine according to need, and
that they are somewhat more likely to show egalitarian behavior when distributing food than any
other good.

Discussion
We have examined the effects of allocation context
and type of good on allocation decisions in order to
further our understanding of the structure of distributive justice behavior. We have examined the distribution of goods central to social welfare programs—
money, prescription medicine, and food—and different
allocation contexts in order to understand how individuals think about the distribution of goods both in
the fair weather of the mundane distributive policies of
the modern state as well as in the foul weather of
natural disasters that bring the issues of distributive
justice to the fore. The allocation task performed by our
participants is admittedly stylized, and very few individuals are likely to find themselves acting as supervisors in a relief center with complete knowledge of the
relevant attributes of the context, goods, and recipients.
Our goal, however, is to understand the structure of
allocation behavior, and especially how individuals
weigh competing allocation principles and what factors
affect how they use these principles. With a better
understanding of justice behavior under these idealized
conditions, we can then see how this behavior is
refracted through the prism of interested behavior
9
The increased egalitarian behavior regarding food is statistically
significant only when comparing between food in the flood
condition and money in the nonflood condition (p , .05) and
between food in the nonflood condition and money in the
nonflood condition (p , .10).
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and other factors at play in making distributive
decisions. Our hope is that the results of our study
and similar ones can be extended to actual behavior by
politicians, policy makers, and citizens when determining who gets what, when, and how.
Our results suggest that individuals’ distributive
justice behavior is strongly influenced by both allocation context and type of good or, more specifically,
we have shown that the distribution of different types
of goods depends critically on context (i.e., the two
variables interact). We expected that individuals
would emphasize different allocation principles according to the context. Overall, this expectation was
confirmed, and we saw that participants tended to
allocate more according to merit in the nonflood
context and to be more oriented toward need in the
flood context. We also expected that individuals
would emphasize different principles according to
the type of good being distributed, and once again we
found overall that this was the case. Notably, individuals tended to emphasize merit when allocating
money and need when allocating prescription
medicine.
Our results concerning the two main and opposed allocation principles of merit and need are thus
generally in accord with our expectations and are in
keeping with studies that have examined allocation
context or good, including Skitka’s (1999) similar study.
The most striking comparison in this regard would
be the behavior of participants in the NonfloodMoney condition compared to the Flood-Medicine
condition, where the proportion of participants allocating according to merit (46.1%) in the NonfloodMoney condition is almost exactly the same proportion
of participants allocating according to need (46.9%)
in the Flood-Medicine condition. Despite the intuitively plausible if striking character of these results,
we also see nonobvious findings. Perhaps most
remarkably, even though participants in the FloodMedicine condition tend as expected to emphasize
need, fully 14.8% of respondents in that condition
still chose to allocate according to merit. In other
words, faced with the dilemma in an emergency
context of distributing prescription medicine between Smith and Jones, where Smith had a demonstrated need of 66 units of prescription medicine and
packaged 34 boxes of supplies whereas Jones needed
only 34 units of prescription medicine and packaged
66 boxes, a sizeable proportion of individuals chose
to give Smith only 34 units of medicine and reward
Jones with 67 units. In other words, we found that
respondents do not behave in a lockstep fashion
according to context and good, and that they still

844
employ a surprising variety of allocation strategies in
every condition
Turning to our third good, food, and our third
major allocation principle, equality, we found a
somewhat unexpected and intriguing result. Compared to money and prescription medicine, participants employed the widest variety of allocation
strategies when allocating food and, more interestingly, exhibited the most attention to equality. This
result might be due to some participants having
reasoned that all recipients have a general need for
food whereas they have differential specific needs for
prescription medicine. If so, then this finding would
further increase doubts raised by some researchers
(see Konow 2003, 1232–34) as to whether equality is
indeed a separate allocation principle, or instead is
either too closely related to need to be distinguishable
or serves as a heuristic in the absence of relevant
information. Clearly, further research is necessary to
understand how—or whether—equality is a distinct
allocation principle.
We were also interested in the effect of individual-level determinants of allocation behavior, especially gender and ideology. Based upon previous
research into distributive justice and public opinion
we expected that women (and liberals) would be
more oriented on average toward need and, conversely, that men (and conservatives) would tend to
emphasize merit. While we found the expected result
for ideology, we did not see any gender difference in
allocation behavior. The absence of an overall gender
difference in our study is somewhat surprising. One
potential explanation for this result is that our
experiment is a microlevel study where participants
do not have to make assumptions or to extrapolate
information about recipients or context, as opposed
to most macrolevel studies, or public opinion surveys, concerning views about the hypothetical or
actual distribution of income or other goods across
an entire society. In our study, participants in
principle perfectly know all the relevant the characteristics of the allocation context, good, and recipients because we stipulate these factors as part of the
experimental manipulations themselves. Most importantly, we stipulate the main characteristics of
the recipients: their demonstrated need for a given
good and their contribution to the (same) productive
task. Women and men participants in our study may
therefore behave in the same way because they share
the same information and assumptions. Other research has shown that in the absence of specific
information participants tend to extrapolate or to
make assumptions in making decisions or judgments
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(see Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986). What the
absence in our study of a difference of behavior
between women and men may suggest, then, is that
the observed gender differences in other studies
regarding distributive justice behavior or core values
determining public opinion could be due in large
measure to the different assumptions women and
men make concerning the overall distribution of goods
in a society. Women and men may, for example, tend
to make different assumptions about the characteristics of the recipients of social welfare programs: for
instance, whether the economically disadvantaged are
‘‘deservingly’’ poor or not. If this conjecture is
correct, the implication is that differences in the core
beliefs and values of women and men are not the
principal underlying cause for observed gender differences, but that assumptions concerning the features
of the distributive context, as they interact with these
core values, explain the observed gender gap in
distributive justice behavior and support for social
welfare policies. Our study thus suggests some obvious lines of research that would confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis about gender.

Conclusion
If the modern state is concerned essentially with who
gets what, when, and how, then questions about the
effect of context and type of good on the distribution
of resources—and their fair distribution—are central
to politics and public opinion. These issues of
distributive justice were dramatically raised by the
allocation of goods in the wake of the flooding caused
by the hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but they are of
perennial concern to politicians and policy makers in
designing and implementing social welfare and other
government programs concerning a variety of different goods, especially in times of emergency or
scarcity. Our study makes both a theoretical and an
empirical contribution to our understanding of
allocation behavior and distributive justice with
implications for understanding the distributive decisions of policy makers as well as citizens’ views of the
fairness and legitimacy of policies.
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